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I. Introduction 
 
Creditors who extend credit or otherwise become entitled to 
payment of obligations owed by debtors have various legal rights 
and expectations, mostly to collect those obligations in due 
course based on agreement or operation of law.  Debtors are 
personally and legally obligated to pay the obligations they 
incur.  When debtors default with respect to payment of those 
obligations, creditors generally have the right to bring a legal 
cause of action against them and acquire a judgment.  Failure 
by the debtor to pay the judgment gives to the judgment creditor 
the right to exercise various post-judgment remedies in order to 
collect the judgment. This includes the attachment and 
foreclosure of nonexempt property owned by the debtor. 
When a debtor is married, issues arise with regard to 
whether the judgment creditor can attach property owned in 
whole or in part by the debtor’s spouse.  There exist two separate 
types of marital property regimes in the United States.  The first 
and most common type is the common law property system 
adopted from the laws of England.  In general, when only one 
spouse is personally liable for an obligation, a judgment creditor 
cannot attach property owned by the other spouse to satisfy the 
judgment.1  Spouses in common law property jurisdictions are 
treated as separate persons with regard to obligations incurred 
by each individual during the marriage.2 
The second type of marital property regime used by nine of 
the states is the community property system, adopted from 
Spanish law.  In this system, marital property is characterized 
as either separate property of one spouse or community 
property.  Separate property is treated generally as if the 
spouses are single and not married.3  As a consequence, with 
 
1.  See Margaret M. Mahoney, The Equitable Distribution of Marital 
Debts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 445, 449–50 (2010) (explaining that in the forty-one 
common law property states, liability for unsecured debts is limited to the 
spouse who incurred the debt). 
2.  See id. at 445 (stating that, in common law property states, spouses 
retain their separate identity with regard to both debts and ownership of 
assets). 
3.  See, e.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 223 (Tex. 1982) 
(stating that separate property owes its existence to things entirely unrelated 
to the marriage, and the spouses are treated as strangers with regard to that 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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respect to obligations for which only one spouse is personally 
liable, separate property in the community property system is 
treated generally the same as marital property in the common 
law property system.  A judgment creditor cannot attach 
separate property owned by the other spouse to satisfy the 
judgment.4  Community property is treated as if each spouse 
owns an undivided one-half interest in such property.5  A 
significant issue in the community property system is to what 
extent a judgment creditor can attach community property to 
satisfy a judgment for which only one spouse is personally liable. 
The nine community property states have adopted a variety 
of distinct rules with regard to this issue.  Some jurisdictions 
have adopted rules that are extremely friendly to creditors, 
allowing the attachment of virtually any nonexempt community 
property to satisfy a judgment for which only one spouse is 
personally liable, regardless of whether the underlying debt was 
incurred before or during the marriage.6  Other jurisdictions 
have adopted rules that are more restrictive with regard to 
creditors, preventing the attachment of certain community 
property based on a variety of factors.7  Part II of this Article will 
provide a review of the rules that are used in both the common 
law property states and the community property states with 
regard to this issue. 
A much more troublesome issue has arisen in the 
community property states when spouses divorce.  Namely, to 
what extent is a creditor allowed to obtain a post-divorce 
judgment against a spouse who is not personally liable for a debt 
incurred by the other spouse either before or during the 
marriage, and attach nonexempt property either received by 
 
property). 
4.  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(a) (West 2006) (providing that a 
spouse’s separate property is not subject to debts for which only the other 
spouse is personally liable). 
5.  See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 449 (explaining that, as a general rule, 
each spouse owns half of all community assets). 
6.  See Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the 
Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor 
Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (discussing Louisiana 
law providing that separate or community obligations may be satisfied from 
any community property). 
7.  See id. at 8–20 (comparing community property states that use a 
managerial system of liability with those that use a community debt system). 
3
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such spouse in the divorce or subsequently acquired by such 
spouse.  This issue has been dealt with in a variety of ways by 
the nine community property states.  Consistent with the first 
issue discussed above involving attachment during the marriage 
of property owned by the non-debtor spouse, some of the states 
have adopted rules that are extremely friendly to creditors,8 and 
others have adopted rules that are more restrictive.9  In some 
jurisdictions, creditors acquire greater rights as a result of the 
divorce than they would have if no divorce had occurred.10  Part 
III of this Article will provide a review of the rules that are used 
in the community property states with regard to this issue. 
The primary thrust of this Article is to address the post-
divorce liability issue outlined in Part III from the perspective of 
debtor-creditor law.  The rules adopted in most of the community 
property jurisdictions with respect to this issue appear to be 
primarily focused on the perspective of marital property and 
family law without regard to general debtor-creditor law 
principles and policies.  For example, basic fraudulent transfer 
law has been ignored in those jurisdictions and not applied in 
the usual manner.  As a result, the rules developed in those 
jurisdictions with regard to the post-divorce liability issue are 
not consistent with the basic principles and policies of debtor-
creditor law.  Part IV of this Article will discuss basic debtor-
creditor law as it relates to this issue, and will propose a set of 
rules which could and should be adopted by the community 
property jurisdictions consistent with debtor-creditor law as it 
applies generally. 
 
II. Liability of Marital Property for Obligations for 
Which Only One Spouse is Personally Liable 
 
Personal liability for obligations is established pursuant to 
 
8.  See James R. Ratner, Creditor and Debtor Windfalls from Divorce, 3 
EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 211, 214–23 (2011) (describing the law of 
community property states, such as Arizona, that actually provide for windfalls 
to creditors when married couples divorce). 
9.  See James W. Paulsen, The Unsecured Texas Creditor’s Post-Divorce 
Claim to Former Community Property, 63 BAYLOR L. REV.781, 812–15 (2011) 
(describing the restrictive approach used in Idaho with regard to this issue). 
10.  See Ratner, supra note 8, at 214–23. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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general principles of law based on the type of obligation involved.  
Executing a contract can cause a person to become contractually 
obligated for a debt.  Committing a tort or crime may cause an 
obligation to be imposed on a person in court or by a federal, 
state, or local law—for example, a tax liability.  Many 
possibilities exist by which a person can become liable for some 
type of obligation.  These rules apply in the same way to both 
single and married persons, with certain exceptions.11  A 
married person may be held liable for the acts of his spouse in 
several situations.  First, some community property states 
recognize the “necessaries doctrine,” in which a spouse is held 
personally liable for debts incurred by the other spouse for 
necessaries, such as food, clothing, or medical care.12  In other 
states, a spouse may be held liable if his or her spouse acts as 
his or her agent under general agency/principal law.13  Other 
legal theories sometimes used to impose liability on a spouse for 
acts of the other spouse include the doctrines of ratification and 
unjust enrichment.14 
It is obvious  that obligations incurred prior to marriage are 
the sole obligation of the person incurring them.  However, 
obligations incurred during marriage may be the sole obligation 
of only one spouse, or may be the joint obligation of both spouses. 
Spouses could be jointly liable under any of the theories 
discussed above,  or because both spouses are jointly liable under 
the applicable rule of law under which liability for the obligation 
is based.  For example, if both spouses execute a contract, they 
are both jointly obligated with respect to it.  If both spouses are 
jointly personally liable for an obligation, the creditor can bring 
a legal cause of action and obtain a judgment against both 
spouses individually and accordingly exercise post-judgment 
 
11.  See James L. Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court: 
Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No Fairy Tale, 41 
FAM. L.Q. 249, 251 (2007) (explaining the manner in which a person could 
become liable for an obligation). 
12.  See Carroll, supra note 6, at 20–23 (explaining the necessaries 
doctrine as it has been applied in five of the community property states). 
13.  See id. at 23 (explaining the manner in which agency/principal law 
has been applied in some states to impose liability on a spouse for acts of the 
other spouse). 
14.  Id. at 24–25 (explaining the manner in which the doctrines of 
ratification and unjust enrichment have been applied in some states to impose 
liability on a spouse for acts of the other spouse). 
5
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remedies against each of them.  If only one spouse is personally 
liable for an obligation, the issue is whether the judgment 
creditor can attach property owned in whole or in part by the 
non-liable spouse. 
Generally speaking, in common law property states, when 
only one spouse is personally liable for an obligation, a judgment 
creditor cannot attach property owned by the other spouse to 
satisfy the judgment.15  Spouses in common law property 
jurisdictions are treated as separate persons with regard to 
obligations incurred by only one of them during the marriage.16 
The nine community property states have adopted a variety 
of distinct rules with regard to this issue.  All nine states are 
typically categorized into one of two systems regarding marital 
property liability:  (1) the managerial system; or (2) the 
community debt system.17 
 
A. The Managerial System 
 
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas are 
typically categorized under the managerial system.18  The basic 
concept of a managerial system is that a creditor should be 
entitled to seize any community property which a spouse 
personally liable for a debt has the power to manage, and 
thereby voluntarily alienate to a creditor.19  It should be noted 
that the underlying goal of this concept is not entirely achieved 
in any of the five states that are typically grouped in this 
category. 
In Texas, determining whether a judgment creditor can 
attach nonexempt property owned in whole or in part by the non-
 
15.  See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 449–50 (explaining that in the forty-
one common law property states, liability for unsecured debts is limited to the 
spouse who incurred the debt). 
16.  See id. at 445 (stating that in the common law property states, 
spouses retain their separate identity with regard to both debts and ownership 
of assets). 
17.  See Carroll, supra note 6, at 9–10 (describing the two basic systems 
for determining marital property liability in the community property states). 
18.  Id. at 11 (stating that these five states are commonly categorized 
under the management system of liability). 
19.  Id. at 11–12 (explaining the basic rationale for the managerial system 
of marital property liability). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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liable spouse requires that the property first be characterized as 
separate property or community property.  This is because a 
spouse’s separate property is not subject to liabilities incurred 
solely by the other spouse.20  Whether community property is 
subject to attachment by a judgment creditor for an obligation 
for which only one spouse is personally liable requires a 
determination of the extent to which the spouses have 
management power over that particular community property.  
By statute, each spouse is given the sole power to manage 
community property constituting (1) that spouse’s personal 
earnings; (2) revenue from that spouse’s separate property; (3) 
recoveries for personal injuries of that spouse; or (4) the increase 
or mutation of, or the revenue from, that spouse’s personal 
earnings, revenue from separate property, or recoveries for 
personal injuries.21  All other community property is subject to 
the joint management and control of the spouses, unless they 
agree otherwise as provided in the statute.22  If a spouse is not 
personally liable for an obligation incurred solely by the other 
spouse, any community property over which that non-liable 
spouse has sole management and control is not subject to that 
obligation if:  (1) the obligation was incurred by the other spouse 
prior to the marriage; or (2) the obligation was incurred by the 
other spouse during the marriage and is non-tortious.23  
Community property subject to joint management and control of 
the spouses can be attached to satisfy any obligation incurred by 
either of the spouses.24  Community property is subject to all 
tortious obligations incurred by either or both spouses during 
the marriage.25 
Texas is unique in its treatment of joint management and 
control over community property.  Except in certain specific 
circumstances provided by statute, each spouse has power to 
manage his undivided one-half interest in the property, but has 
no power to manage the interest of the other spouse.26  Thus, 
 
20.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(a) (West 2006). 
21.  See id. § 3.102(a). 
22.  See id. § 3.102(c). 
23.  See id. § 3.202(b). 
24.  See id. § 3.202(c). 
25.  See id. § 3.202(d). 
26.  See, e.g., Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. 
7
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both spouses must participate in and consent to a particular 
transaction with respect to community property subject to joint 
management and control.27 
It is clear then that Texas does not adhere strictly to the 
basic concept of the managerial system for marital property 
liability, which is that a creditor should be entitled to seize any 
community property with respect to which a spouse personally 
liable for a debt has the power to manage, and thereby 
voluntarily alienate to a creditor.  A spouse lacks the power to 
alienate to a creditor the other spouse’s one-half undivided 
interest in joint management community property, yet 
community property subject to joint management and control of 
the spouses can be attached to satisfy any obligation incurred by 
either of the spouses.  Additionally, all community property is 
subject to all tortious obligations incurred by either or both 
spouses during the marriage, regardless of which spouse has 
management power over the property.  However, it is equally 
clear that Texas comes the closest by far to achieving the goal 
underlying this basic concept. 
The remaining four states that are typically grouped in the 
managerial system category—California, Idaho, Louisiana, and 
Nevada—provide rules for determining management and 
control of community property that seem wholly unrelated to the 
applicable rules that determine which community property is 
available to satisfy debts incurred by only one spouse.  In fact, it 
has been suggested that California and Louisiana are included 
in the managerial system category solely because they 
determine liability of marital property for debts without regard 
to whether the debt was incurred in the interest of the family or 
for the benefit of the community, and thus clearly do not fit into 
 
App. 1974) (holding that a lien conveyed by husband to bank on real property 
was not effective with regard to wife’s one-half interest in community property 
because wife did not execute the deed of trust). 
27.  See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL & SALLY BROWN 
RICHARDSON, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 255 (8th ed. 
Carolina Acad. Press 2015) (noting that the Texas statutes dealing with joint 
management of community property require concurrence of both spouses); see 
also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (West 2006) (providing an important 
exception allowing a spouse to alienate the entirety of joint management 
community property titled in that spouse’s name or in that spouse’s possession 
(if not subject to evidence of ownership) once certain conditions are met). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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the community debt system category.28  In all four states, the 
basic rule with respect to management of community personal 
property is that each spouse has the power unilaterally to 
manage and alienate all such property;29 for management of 
community real property, the basic rule is that both spouses 
must act together to manage or alienate the property.30 
With regard to liability of community property for debts 
solely incurred by one spouse, California and Louisiana, by 
statute, permit creditors to reach almost any community 
property for virtually any debt incurred by either spouse 
regardless of which spouse has management power over that 
property.31  California affords a limited exception to that basic 
rule, providing that earnings during marriage are exempt from 
 
28.  See Carroll, supra note 6, at 13–14 (noting that California and 
Louisiana are grouped with Idaho, Nevada, and Texas under the managerial 
umbrella because those states determine liability of marital property without 
regard to whether the particular debt was incurred in the interest of the family 
or for the benefit of the community, both of which are hallmarks of the 
community debt system); see also REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 
27, at 312 (explaining that the current rules in all states which utilize the 
management system, other than Texas, “make it difficult, if not misleading, to 
say that management power determines” the right of creditors to seize 
community property for the debts of only one spouse, “[y]et the chief 
implication of a managerial system, that the creditor’s right to seize 
community property does not depend on the classification of the debt as a 
community debt, is still the rule” in those states). 
29.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 255 (stating that, 
in all community property states other than Texas, “the basic rule concerning 
power to manage and alienate community personal property is equal 
management based on concurrently possessed power to act unilaterally” 
(footnote omitted)); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 32-912 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (West 2009); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2007). 
30.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 255 n.1 (stating 
that “[w]ith respect to community realty, the basic rule in equal management 
jurisdictions is that alienation requires concurrent actions by both 
spouses . . .”); CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1102(a) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 32-912 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (West 2009); and 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2007). 
31.  See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 910(a) (West 2004) (providing that, except 
in limited situations provided specifically by statute, all community property 
is liable for any debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, 
regardless of which spouse has management rights with respect to the property 
and which spouse is personally liable for the debt); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2345 (West 2009) (providing that a separate or community obligation may be 
satisfied from community property). 
9
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debts incurred by the other spouse prior to marriage if certain 
requirements are met.32  Idaho has a statute that allows either 
spouse to “bind the community property by contract.”33  
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Idaho has long held that all 
“debts of either spouse may be paid from community property.”34  
Courts have similarly held that the basic rule in Nevada is the 
same as in California, Louisiana, and Idaho—that all 
community property is within creditor reach for any debt 
incurred by either of the spouses.35  Similar to California, 
Nevada has a statute stating simply that a spouse’s share of 
community property is exempt from debts of the other spouse 
contracted for prior to marriage.36 
 
B. The Community Debt System 
 
Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin are 
typically categorized under the community debt system.37  
Under this system, determining whether a judgment creditor 
can attach nonexempt property owned in whole or in part by the 
non-liable spouse requires that the debt first be classified as a 
separate or community debt.38  Classification of debts is 
determined based on whether the spouse incurring the debt was 
acting for the benefit of the community.39  If this is the case, the 
 
32.  See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 911 (West 2004). 
33.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that either 
spouse may bind the community property by contract). 
34.  See Credit Bureau of E. Idaho, Inc., v. Lecheminant, 235 P.3d 1188, 
1192–93 (Idaho 2010) (citations omitted) (explaining that community property 
is liable for debts of either spouse). 
35.  See United States v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487, 491 n.12 
(9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in equal management community property states, 
including California, Louisiana, Idaho, and Nevada, debts incurred by only one 
spouse during marriage may be satisfied from community property and from 
the separate property of the liable spouse). 
36.  See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2007). 
37.  See Carroll, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that Arizona, New Mexico, 
Washington, and Wisconsin have rejected the managerial system and have 
instead opted for the community debt system); see also REPPY, SAMUEL & 
RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 327. 
38.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 327 (stating that 
those states “require that tort and contract debts be classified as community 
or separate at the time the creditor seeks to be paid”). 
39.  See Carroll, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that the policy supporting the 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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debt is classified as a community debt, meaning that community 
property can be attached to satisfy a judgment obtained with 
respect to it.40 
Case law in Arizona, New Mexico, and Washington has 
created a presumption that all contractual debts incurred during 
marriage are community debts.41  Wisconsin has a statute that 
specifically provides for this presumption and extends to tortious 
obligations.42  Each state requires clear and convincing evidence 
to overcome this presumption.43  Thus, only in rare instances 
will a debt incurred during marriage not be classified as a 
community debt.44  In Wisconsin, the community debt 
presumption can be made conclusive if the debtor unilaterally 
signs a statement before the obligation is incurred stating: “the 
obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of the marriage 
or the family.”45  New Mexico has a statute that allows a spouse 
and creditor to agree, at the time a debt is incurred, that it will 
be classified as separate.46  In Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Washington, where there is no presumption that tortious 
obligations incurred during marriage are community debts, 
courts have generally been willing to find that most such 
obligations were incurred for the benefit of the community and, 
 
community debt system is that community property should be held liable only 
for debts incurred while a spouse is acting for the benefit of the community). 
40.  See id. at 6, 17–18 (explaining that, once a debt is classified as a 
community debt, in all the community debt states except Wisconsin, “the 
entirety of the community property between husband and wife . . . could be 
seized to satisfy the husband’s premarital debt” (footnote omitted)). 
41.  See id. at 18 (stating that those states “employ a presumption that a 
contractual obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage is one for the 
benefit of the community, and thus is a community debt” (footnote omitted)); 
see also REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328. 
42.  See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 2009). 
43.  See Carroll, supra note 6, at 18–19 (stating that the clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard is required to overcome the community debt 
presumption in every community debt state); see also REPPY, SAMUEL & 
RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328. 
44.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328–29 
(discussing two Washington cases in which the court held that contractual 
obligations incurred during marriage were not community debts). 
45.  WISC. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 2009); see also Carroll, supra note 
6, at 19. 
46.  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9(A)(4) (2016); see also REPPY, SAMUEL & 
RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 329. 
11
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thus, are community obligations.47 
Premarital obligations are not community debts.  The 
obligor spouse could not have been acting for the benefit of the 
community when incurring the debt because the marriage did 
not yet exist at that time.48 
After debts have been classified as either separate or 
community, it can then be determined which marital property is 
subject to attachment for those debts.  The rules differ among 
the states using the community debt system.  New Mexico 
provides for a statutory scheme by which community debts must 
be satisfied from the following property in the order stated: first, 
from all community property and certain other property in 
which the spouses own an equal interest, except for the spouses’ 
residence; second, from the residence of the spouses except as 
otherwise provided; third, from the separate property of the 
spouse who is obligated for the debt.49  Separate debts must be 
satisfied from the following property in the order stated: first, 
from the separate property of the spouse who is obligated for the 
debt, except for certain property in which the spouses own an 
equal interest; second, from the obligated spouse’s one-half 
interest in community property and certain other property in 
which the spouses own an equal interest, except for the spouses’ 
residence; third, from the obligated spouse’s interest in the 
residence of the spouses except as otherwise provided.50  Thus, 
in New Mexico, community debts are generally satisfied from 
community property and from separate property of the obligated 
spouse.  Separate debts, including debts incurred prior to 
marriage, are satisfied generally from separate property of the 
obligated spouse and that spouse’s one-half interest in 
community property. 
 
 
47.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 329 (explaining 
that, although the burden of proof is on the tort victim/creditor to prove that 
the tortious activity benefited the community, courts have held that 
“recreation—just enjoying life—is a community activity,” and the resulting 
tortious obligations were thus community debts). 
48.  See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9(A)(1) (2016) (specifically including 
debts contracted or incurred by a spouse before marriage in the definition of a 
separate debt). 
49.  See id. § 40-3-11(A). 
50.  See id. § 40-3-10(A). 
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Arizona’s rules are also provided by statute and treat 
premarital debt in a separate category than debt incurred 
during marriage.  Community property is liable for the 
premarital debts of a spouse “only to the extent of the value of 
that spouse’s contribution to the community property which 
would have been such spouse’s separate property if single.”51  
Community debt incurred during the marriage must be satisfied 
“first, from the community property, and second, from the 
separate property of the spouse contracting the debt or 
obligation.”52  Separate debts can be satisfied only from the 
separate property of the spouse obligated for the debt.53 
Wisconsin also provides for a statutory scheme.  Wisconsin 
is similar to Arizona in the manner which it treats premarital 
debts, which can only be satisfied from the separate property of 
the spouse obligated for the debt and from that part of the 
community property “which would have been the property of 
that spouse but for the enactment of this chapter.”54  Wisconsin 
differs, however, from New Mexico and Arizona by treating 
tortious obligations incurred by a spouse during marriage 
separately from other obligations incurred during marriage.  
Tortious obligations incurred by a spouse during marriage may 
be satisfied from the separate property of that spouse and from 
that spouse’s interest in community property.55  Non-tortious 
community debts incurred during marriage can be satisfied from 
all community property and from the separate property of the 
liable spouse.56  Non-tortious separate debts incurred during 
marriage can be satisfied first from the separate property of that 
spouse, and second from that spouse’s interest in community 
property, in that order.57 
 
51.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215(B) (West 2007). 
52.  Id. § 25-215(D) 
53.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 327–28 (citing 
GAF Corp. v. Diamond Carpet Corp., 572 P.2d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)). 
54.  WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.31, 766.55(2)(c)(2) (West 2009) (using and 
defining the terms marital property and individual property, which are 
generally considered substantially similar to community property and separate 
property, as those terms are used in the other eight community property 
states). 
55.  See id. § 766.55(2)(cm). 
56.  Id. § 766.55(2)(b). 
57.  See id. §§ 766.55(2)(d), 766.555 (providing special rules that apply to 
an open-end plan, defined to include credit cards and similar types of credit 
13
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The rules in Washington have been established mostly by 
case law.  As in Wisconsin, Washington distinguishes tortious 
from non-tortious obligations and treats them differently, but in 
a somewhat more convoluted manner.  For tortious obligations 
which are incurred during marriage and are classified as 
community debts, creditors can reach the separate property of 
the obligated spouse and all of the community property.58  For 
tortious obligations incurred during marriage that are classified 
as separate debts, creditors can first reach the separate property 
of the obligated spouse and then that spouse’s one-half interest 
in community property, in that order.59  The same rule applies 
to tortious obligations incurred prior to marriage.60  For non-
tortious debts incurred prior to marriage, Washington has a 
statute allowing those debts to be satisfied from the earnings 
and accumulations of the obligated spouse if judgment is 
obtained within three years of the marriage.61  For non-tortious 
debts incurred during the marriage, the rules in Washington are 
similar to those in Arizona.  Community debts can be satisfied 
from community property and from the separate property of the 
obligated spouse.62  Separate debts can be satisfied only from the 
separate property of the spouse obligated for the debt.63 
 
arrangements if certain conditions are met). 
58.  See deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835, 840 (Wash. 1980) (holding that 
torts classified as community obligations “will remain community torts with 
the community and the tortfeasor separately liable”). 
59.  See id. (holding that, for torts not classified as community obligations, 
separate property of the tortfeasor will be primarily liable and, if that property 
is insufficient to satisfy the obligation, the tortfeasor’s one-half interest in 
community personal property will become liable); see also Keene v. Edie, 935 
P.2d 588, 594–95 (Wash. 1997) (holding that, for torts not classified as 
community obligations, the tortfeasor’s one-half interest in community real 
property is liable after exhaustion of the tortfeasor’s separate property and 
one-half interest in community personal property). 
60.  See Haley v. Highland, 12 P.3d 119, 127 (Wash. 2000) (holding that 
the rules applicable to torts not classified as community obligations apply also 
to torts committed prior to marriage). 
61.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.200 (West 2005). 
62.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 328 (stating that 
the rules in Arizona, New Mexico, and Wisconsin, which allows community 
creditors to reach both community property and the obligor spouse’s separate 
property, is probably the rule in Washington as well, and citing authority for 
that proposition). 
63.  See Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985) 
(explaining that the rules adopted in deElche for separate tort obligations 
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III. Liability of Spouses After Divorce in Community Property 
Jurisdictions for Debts Solely Incurred by the Other Spouse 
Prior to or During Marriage 
 
When married couples divorce, new issues arise with 
respect to obligations one or both of the spouses incurred either 
prior to or during the marriage.  Common law and community 
property jurisdictions alike have established rules for courts to 
use in dealing with those obligations in the context of the divorce 
and in dividing the marital property estate.  One issue likely to 
arise in most situations is to what extent a creditor can bring an 
action against the spouses after the divorce to collect its debt.  A 
general rule that prevails in all of the common law and 
community property states is that a divorce decree ordering one 
spouse to pay a debt is binding only on the spouses and not on a 
creditor which was not a party to the decree; the divorce decree 
cannot reduce any rights the creditor had prior to the divorce.64  
Thus, if both spouses are liable for an obligation, the creditor 
can, either prior to or after divorce, bring an action and obtain 
a personal judgment against either or both of them.65 
The particular issue that will be addressed here is one that 
has become quite troublesome in the community property 
jurisdictions: namely, to what extent a creditor is allowed to 
 
constituted a departure from the general rule that a creditor is not allowed to 
reach community property to satisfy a separate debt). 
64.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 335 (discussing 
a general rule that a divorce decree “cannot reduce the rights of pre-divorce 
creditors of one spouse to reach property awarded the other if that property 
would have been liable absent the divorce”); see also Margaret M. Mahoney, 
Debts, Divorce, and Disarray in Bankruptcy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 83, 88 (2004) 
(stating the general rule that rights of a creditor established during the 
marriage of the debtor is not affected by the debtor’s subsequent divorce). 
65.  See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (West 2009) (providing that an 
obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage may be satisfied after divorce 
from separate property of that spouse); Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v. 
Roderiguez, 770 P.2d 533, 538 (N.M. 1989) (holding that the spouses’ marriage 
settlement agreement pursuant to their divorce had no effect on the rights of 
a pre-divorce creditor who was not a party to the agreement); Marine Midland 
Bank v. Monroe, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev. 1988) (holding that a divorce decree 
to which a creditor was not a party did not divest the creditor of the right to 
collect its debt from a spouse who was liable); Broadway Drug Store of 
Galveston, Inc. v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) 
(holding that a “court in a divorce action has no power to disturb the rights 
which creditors lawfully have against the parties”). 
15
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obtain a judgment after divorce against a spouse who is not 
personally liable for a debt solely incurred by the other spouse 
either before or during the marriage and, accordingly, to what 
extent such a creditor is allowed to attach nonexempt property 
either received by the non-liable spouse in the divorce or 
subsequently acquired by such spouse.66  This is not an issue in 
common law property jurisdictions for the reasons discussed in 
Part II.  Generally, when only one spouse is personally liable for 
an obligation in common law property states, a judgment 
creditor cannot attach property owned by the other spouse to 
satisfy the judgment.67  Spouses in common law property 
jurisdictions are treated as separate persons with regard to 
obligations incurred by only one of them during the marriage.68  
The rules developed by each of the community property 
jurisdictions with respect to this issue are quite distinct and will 
be discussed separately for each jurisdiction. 
 
A. Idaho 
 
The rules in Idaho for dealing with this issue were explained 
by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Holley.69  In that case, John Holley (“Husband”) borrowed 
money from Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. (“Bank”) for use in a 
construction business which he operated.70  On June 26, 1981, 
 
66.  This is not a significant issue in common law property jurisdictions.  
See generally Mahoney, supra note 1, at 456 (explaining the post-divorce rights 
of creditors in common law property jurisdictions, namely that, while courts in 
common law property states have a certain amount of power in a divorce to 
allocate marital debts between the spouses, those courts have no power to 
modify the rights of third-party creditors with respect to the individual 
spouses, unless the creditors are joined as parties in the divorce proceeding.  
As a result, a creditor will be entitled after the divorce to proceed against 
whichever of the spouses is personally liable for the obligation.  That is, of 
course, the same right the creditor has during the marriage in a common law 
jurisdiction.). 
67.  See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 449–50 (explaining that, in the forty-
one common law property states, liability for unsecured debts is limited to the 
spouse who incurred the debt). 
68.  See id. at 445 (noting that in the common law property states, spouses 
retain their separate identity with regard to both debts and ownership of 
assets). 
69.  723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986). 
70.  Id. at 894. 
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Husband borrowed additional funds from Bank and executed an 
unsecured promissory note, due on September 28, 1981, for the 
total amount owed to Bank.71  Husband was married to Joan 
Holley (“Wife”) at the time of these events, but Wife did not 
execute the promissory note.72  Husband and Wife were divorced 
on August 28, 1981, pursuant to which Husband was awarded 
the construction business (a community asset) and assumed 
liability for payment of the June 26, 1981 promissory note.73  
Husband did not pay that note on its September 28, 1981 due 
date, instead executing with Bank an agreement extending the 
due date of the promissory note to November 22, 1981 and 
granting to Bank a security interest in certain real and personal 
property to secure the note.74  Husband was solvent at the time 
he executed the extension agreement, but subsequently 
defaulted on his obligation to Bank and filed for bankruptcy.75  
The Bank eventually sued Wife for non-payment of the 
promissory note.76 
In its opinion, the Court explained “[t]his case can be 
resolved based on fundamental principles governing the debtor-
creditor relationship.”77  When a creditor obtains a judgment, he 
can proceed to collect his judgment by executing on the debtor’s 
assets.  Those rules apply in the same way to married and 
unmarried debtors.78  The only difference is that, if the debtor is 
married, the creditor can execute on community property owned 
by the debtor and his spouse as well as the debtor’s separate 
property.79  In this case, only Husband executed the promissory 
note and was personally liable for the obligation to Bank.80  On 
June 26, 1981, when Bank had a claim against Husband for 
unpaid obligations due at that time and Husband and Wife were 
still married, Bank could have brought an action against 
Husband and Wife, obtained a judgment, and proceeded to 
 
71.  Id. at 894–95. 
72.  Id. at 895. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986). 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 896. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at 896–97. 
80.  Id. at 897. 
17
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collect that judgment from Husband and Wife’s community 
property and Husband’s separate property.81  Instead, Bank 
chose to have Husband execute a promissory note due 
September 28, 1981.82  When that note became due, Husband 
and Wife were already divorced.83  The Bank was unsuccessful 
in its efforts against Husband to fully satisfy Husband’s 
obligation to Bank pursuant to the promissory note.84 
The issue then became whether Bank could bring an action 
against Wife, who was not personally liable on the promissory 
note, obtain a judgment, and collect that judgment from formerly 
community property received in the divorce by Wife.85  The Court 
held that “a creditor may not, with one exception, proceed 
against community assets distributed to [a spouse] pursuant to 
a divorce decree” if that spouse is not personally liable for the 
obligation to that creditor.86  The Court cited to an earlier case, 
Spokane Merchants’ Ass’n v. Olmstead,87 for the exception: in a 
divorce, when only one spouse is personally liable for an 
obligation incurred during the marriage, “but is not awarded 
sufficient community assets to satisfy such a debt, a creditor 
may properly seek satisfaction for the debt from community 
property distributed to the other spouse.”88  The Court explained 
the purpose for the exception is to prevent spouses from utilizing 
“divorce proceedings to perpetrate a fraud on creditors of the 
community.”89  It held that the exception did not apply in Twin 
Falls because the trial record clearly indicated that “sufficient 
assets were distributed to [Husband] as part of the divorce 
proceedings which would have enabled him to satisfy the 
community obligation [to Bank] which he assumed pursuant to 
the property settlement agreement.”90  Accordingly, the Court 
 
81.  Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986). 
82.  Id. at 894–95. 
83.  Id. at 895. 
84.  Id. at 897. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893, 897 (Idaho 1986) 
(citing 327 P.2d 385 (Idaho 1958)). 
88.  Id. at 897. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 898. 
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held in favor of Wife.91 
The rules in Idaho with respect to this issue are very 
restrictive with regard to rights of creditors.  A creditor who 
extends credit for which only one spouse is personally liable will 
potentially have fewer rights to execute on property in a 
collection action if its debtor spouse is divorced before the 
creditor brings its action.  Any community property that would 
be available to the creditor for execution during the marriage 
will not be available if distributed to the non-liable spouse in the 
divorce, subject to the exception stated in Twin Falls. 
 
B. California 
 
The rules in California with respect to this issue are 
provided by statute and are potentially very restrictive as to 
rights of creditors.  The basic premise underlying the statute is 
that debts owed by the spouses at the time of divorce will be 
assigned for payment to one of the spouses as part of the division 
of property in the divorce.92  The statute provides that such 
assignment cannot relieve a spouse of personal liability for a 
debt for which such spouse is personally liable at the time of the 
divorce.93  Thus, if both spouses are personally liable for a debt, 
they will remain personally liable after the divorce, regardless 
of which spouse was assigned the debt for payment.  Likewise, if 
only one spouse is personally liable for a debt and the debt is 
assigned to the other spouse, the liable spouse will remain 
personally liable after the divorce.  When a debt for which only 
one spouse is personally liable is assigned to the non-liable 
spouse, the effect is to make that non-liable spouse personally 
liable for the debt;94 but if that debt is not assigned to the non-
liable spouse, none of that spouse’s separate property owned at 
the time of divorce or community property received by that 
 
91.  Id. 
92.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 916(a) (West 2004) (providing that debts be 
assigned for payment to one of the spouses in a divorce). 
93.  Id. § 916(a)(1) (providing that a spouse remains personally liable for 
a debt incurred by that spouse before or during marriage regardless of whether 
the debt was assigned to the other spouse in the divorce). 
94.  Id. § 916(a)(3) (providing that a spouse to whom a debt, incurred by 
the other spouse before or during marriage, is assigned for payment in the 
divorce is personally liable for such debt). 
19
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spouse in the divorce is liable for that debt, and that spouse has 
no personal liability for that debt.95 
Because debts are normally assigned under these provisions 
to the spouse who is personally liable for the debt, these rules 
usually have the effect of substantially restricting the rights of 
creditors subsequent to the divorce.96  Consistent with Idaho, a 
creditor who extends credit for which only one spouse is 
personally liable will potentially have fewer rights to execute on 
property in a collection action if its debtor-spouse is divorced 
before the creditor brings its action.  Any community property 
that would be available to the creditor for execution during the 
marriage will not be available if it is distributed to the non-liable 
spouse in the divorce and if such non-liable spouse is not 
assigned the debt for payment.  However, if the non-liable 
spouse is assigned the debt for payment in the divorce, the 
creditor’s rights will actually be increased after the divorce 
because assignment of the debt to the non-liable spouse will 
make that spouse personally liable for the debt.  The creditor 
could then execute on separate property of the non-liable spouse, 
including property acquired by such spouse after the divorce, 
which the creditor would not have been entitled to do had there 
been no divorce.97 
These statutory provisions have been criticized for enabling 
spouses to agree to the terms of their divorce and utilize 
strategies that detrimentally affect their creditors.98  For 
 
95.  Id. § 916(a)(2) (providing that a spouse is not liable for a debt incurred 
by the other spouse before or during marriage unless that debt was assigned 
for payment to such spouse in the divorce). 
96.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 336 (stating that 
“in the usual situation where the debt is assigned to the debtor-spouse, divorce 
will often relegate the creditor of the debtor-spouse to half of the community 
property he could have reached before the divorce”); see also Mejia v. Reed, 74 
P.3d 166, 171 (Cal. 2003) (stating that the legislature, in enacting the 
predecessor statute to Section 916 of the California Family Code, determined 
that, in most circumstances, after a divorce, it is unwise to continue the 
liability of spouses for community debts incurred by the other spouse). 
97.  See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (explaining that, in the 
community property jurisdictions, a judgment creditor cannot attach separate 
property owned by a spouse to satisfy a judgment with respect to an obligation 
for which only the other spouse is personally liable). 
98.  See Ratner, supra, note 8, at 212–13 (describing how the rules in 
California allowing married couples to decide the manner in which their debts 
will be assigned has the potential for detrimentally affecting the rights of their 
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example, assume that only husband is personally liable for all 
the debts incurred during the marriage; the couple could 
strategically divorce and assign all the debts to husband and 
agree that wife will receive all the community property.  
Husband will have no assets which the creditors can attach after 
the divorce.  California courts have responded to these concerns 
by identifying an important exception to the statutory provisions 
for situations in which blind application of the statutory rules 
would result in substantial unfairness to the rights of 
creditors.99  In Mejia v. Reed,100 a husband (“Husband”) had an 
extramarital relationship, resulting in the birth of a child, and 
was subsequently ordered to pay child support to the child’s 
mother (“Creditor”).101  The Husband and his wife later divorced, 
the terms of which they memorialized in a marital settlement 
agreement (“MSA”).102  The MSA required Husband to transfer 
all of his interest in jointly owned real property to wife.103  The 
property received by husband pursuant to the MSA ultimately 
proved to be worthless, and husband was subsequently left with 
no assets and little income with which to pay the child support 
obligation.104  Creditor filed an action asserting that the transfer 
of husband’s interest in the real property to wife under the MSA 
constituted a fraudulent transfer and requested that a lien be 
imposed upon the property pursuant to California fraudulent 
transfer law.105  In this case of first impression in California, the 
Court addressed the issue of whether the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (“UFTA”), as adopted by California, applies to 
transfers of property in a divorce under California Family Code 
Section 916.106  The Court was forced to apply established rules 
of statutory construction to resolve that issue and noted that 
 
creditors). 
99.  See REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 336 (discussing 
situations in which California courts have held that a creditor is not bound by 
the property division in a divorce). 
100.  See generally 74 P.3d at 166–176. 
101.  Id. at 169. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 169 (Cal. 2003). 
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neither statute expressly refers to the other.107  After evaluating 
the two separate statutory schemes and addressing issues of 
public policy, the Court determined that the UFTA did, in fact, 
apply to property transfers in divorce pursuant to marital 
settlement agreements.108  The Court then applied the UFTA to 
the case at bar and determined that whether Husband engaged 
in actual fraud with regard to the transfer of his interest in the 
real property to his wife under the MSA was “a triable issue for 
decision by the trial court,” and accordingly remanded the case 
for further proceedings.109 
 
C. Louisiana 
 
The rules in Louisiana with respect to this issue are 
provided by statute.  The general rule is mostly neutral with 
respect to creditors, providing that “[a]n obligation incurred by 
a spouse before or during the community property regime may 
be satisfied after termination of the regime from the property of 
the former community and from the separate property of the 
spouse who incurred the obligation.”110  Thus, the general rule 
extends the rules for liability of marital property for debts 
incurred prior to or during marriage to the period after 
divorce.111  Because creditors can reach the same property after 
divorce and during the marriage, their rights are typically 
neither reduced nor enhanced as a result of a divorce.  In 
 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 170–74 (quoting Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 925 P.2d 
1002, 1013 (Cal. 1996)) (explaining that the Court noted California legislative 
policy requires a court to allocate debts to spouses in a divorce to account for 
the rights of creditors “so there will be available sufficient property to satisfy 
the debt by the person to whom the debt is assigned”).  In limiting its decision 
to property transfers pursuant to marital settlement agreements, the Court 
noted that “when the court divides the marital property in the absence of an 
agreement by the parties, it must divide the property equally . . . which 
provides some protection for a creditor of one spouse only.”  Id. at 173. 
109.  Id. at 174–76. 
110.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (West 2009). 
111.  See id. art. 2345 (providing that a separate or community obligation 
may be satisfied from community property); see also supra notes 2–3 and 
accompanying text (explaining that, in the community property jurisdictions, 
a judgment creditor cannot attach separate property owned by a spouse to 
satisfy a judgment with respect to an obligation for which only the other spouse 
is personally liable). 
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addition, the statute provides that “[i]f a spouse disposes of 
property of the former community for a purpose other than the 
satisfaction of community obligations, he is liable for all 
obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value of that 
community property.”112  The term community obligation is 
defined for purposes of this statute as “[a]n obligation incurred 
by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime 
for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the 
other spouse.”113  A spouse can avoid the liability imposed under 
this statute for disposing of former community property after 
divorce by assuming, in writing, “responsibility for one-half of 
each community obligation incurred by the other spouse.”114 
 
D. Texas 
 
The rules in Texas with respect to this issue have been 
provided by a majority of the intermediate courts of appeal; the 
Supreme Court of Texas has not ruled directly on the issue.115  
The existence of the rules provided by the courts of appeal, 
however, appear to be universally accepted by “respected 
academicians, continuing legal education speakers, practice 
guides, and popular bar review outlines.”116  The general rule is 
the same as that in Louisiana: unsecured creditors of a spouse 
are allowed to attach the same property after divorce as they 
could have attached during the marriage.117 
The principal decision cited as authority for this rule is 
Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston,118 decided by the San Antonio 
 
112.  Id. art. 2357. 
113.  Id. art. 2360. 
114.  Id. art. 2357. 
115.  See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 794–810. 
116.  Id. at 794–96 (citations omitted); but see Joseph W. McKnight, 
Commentary to Family Code § 5.61, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1108, 1110 (1990) 
(soundly criticizing the rationale for these rules); Paulsen, supra note 9, at 
815–49 (same). 
117.  See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 794–810 (explaining that “the idea that 
one spouse’s unsecured creditors can reach the same assets after divorce as 
those creditors could reach beforehand” has wide support in Texas, and 
referring to an outstanding and exhaustive discussion of case law underlying 
and explaining the development of this rule in Texas). 
118.  598 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App. 1980), writ refused NRE per curiam, 608 
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980). 
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Court of Appeals.  The Court stated that, as a general rule, “a 
spouse who receives property [in a divorce] which would, absent 
a divorce, be subject to the claims of creditors remains personally 
liable, and the property so received remains subject to being 
taken to satisfy the claims of the community creditors.”119  Thus, 
if a spouse not personally liable for a debt owed to a creditor 
receives property in the divorce that could have been attached 
by that creditor during the marriage, the creditor is allowed to 
bring a collections proceeding after divorce to attach that 
property.  That is true even though the spouse who received that 
property in the divorce is not personally liable for the debt to 
that creditor.120  An illustration provided in a previous article 
published by this author is as follows: 
 
To illustrate, Husband (H) incurs a debt to 
Creditor (C), for which only H is personally liable. 
H and Wife (W) own nonexempt land that is 
subject to the joint management and control of 
both H and W. H defaults on his debt to C, and C 
sues H and obtains a judgment. Under the marital 
property liability rules discussed above, C may 
attach the land to satisfy the judgment. If, before 
C either acquires his judgment or attaches the 
land, H and W are divorced, and W receives the 
land in the divorce, C may obtain a judgment 
against W and attach the land, notwithstanding 
that W has no personal liability to C with respect 
to the debt. W, however, will have no personal 
liability with respect to the judgment. The 
judgment will be ‘in rem’ with respect to the land, 
 
119.  Id. at 323 (citations omitted). 
120.  See Musselman, supra note 11, at 260 (explaining the circumstances 
pursuant to which a creditor can bring a collection action post-divorce against 
a spouse who is not personally liable for the debt owed to that creditor).  The 
right to bring that action by the creditor does not create personal liability for 
the non-liable spouse receiving the property in the divorce; it is only the 
property that is liable for the debt.  See id. (citing State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. 
Williams, 791 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App., 1990) writ denied, 791 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 
App. 1990)) (stating that the creditor can obtain only an “‘in rem’ judgment 
against the property as opposed to a personal judgment against the spouse who 
received that property in the divorce”). 
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meaning that its sole effect will be to allow C to 
attach the land to satisfy the judgment.121 
 
Thus, the rules in Texas regarding this issue are mostly 
neutral with respect to creditors.  Because creditors can reach 
the same property after divorce that they can reach during the 
marriage, their rights are typically neither reduced nor 
enhanced as a result of a divorce.122 
 
E. Washington 
 
The rules in Washington for dealing with this issue were 
explained by the Supreme Court of Washington in Watters v. 
Doud.123  In that case, Charles Doud (“Husband”), during his 
marriage to Judith Doud (“Wife”), executed a promissory note 
payable to Harry Watters (“Creditor”) to evidence a debt in the 
approximate amount of $15,000.124  Husband and Wife 
subsequently divorced; the property settlement provided that 
Husband would pay the debt to Creditor and that the community 
home would be transferred to Wife.125  Husband eventually 
defaulted on the debt to Creditor, and Creditor acquired a 
judgment and attempted to satisfy it by executing on the 
community home received by Wife in the divorce.126 
The first issue addressed by the Court—and the only issue 
relevant here—was “whether after a marriage dissolution, 
previously community held assets are fully available, including 
their post-divorce appreciated value, to satisfy debts incurred by 
the former marital community.”127  The Court cited to its 
previous decisions holding that “separate property contributions 
to an asset previously owned by the marital community, and 
which were made after the divorce, are not subject to preexisting 
 
121.  Id. 
122.  But see Paulsen, supra note 9, at 841–42 (describing a situation in 
which a creditor’s position could be enhanced as a result of a divorce). 
123.  See generally 631 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1981) (en banc). 
124.  Id. at 370. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. 
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community debts.”128  The Court stated that previous cases had 
held only that property “formerly owned by the community can 
be levied upon for the community’s debts,”129 and that the issue 
regarding post-divorce appreciation in value was one of first 
impression in Washington.130  The Court decided the issue by 
adopting the rule prevailing at that time in California;131 
namely, that “since all property becomes separate upon divorce, 
all net equity arising thereafter must be separate in character 
and thus is unavailable to community creditors.”132  The Court 
explained that it was adopting that rule because it “is preferable 
on the basis of equity and generally applicable community 
property principles,”133 noting that “[o]ur cases have also 
exempted separate property and its appreciation from the claims 
of community creditors.”134  The Court further justified its 
decision by explaining that “[c]reditors are adequately protected 
without making post-divorce equity available to them” because 
they are permitted “to execute upon formerly community held 
assets to the extent of the community’s net equity [at the time of 
divorce].”135  The Court also noted that creditors have other 
traditional remedies available to them, such as having “a 
property settlement agreement set aside by proving the divorce 
was an attempt to defraud them.”136 
The rules with respect to this issue are thus somewhat more 
limited in Washington with regard to the rights of creditors than 
those in Louisiana and Texas.  Creditors in Louisiana and Texas 
are permitted to attach the same property after divorce that they 
can during marriage to the full extent of the value of that 
property at the time of attachment, including any post-divorce 
appreciation in the value of such property.  Creditors in 
Washington are allowed to attach all property that was formerly 
part of the community property estate, but only to the extent of 
the net equity in such property at the time of the divorce. 
 
128.  Id. 
129.  Watters v. Doud, 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981) (en banc). 
130.  Id. at 370–71. 
131.  Id. at 371. 
132.  Id. at 370. 
133.  Id. at 371. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Watters v. Doud, 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981) (en banc). 
136.  Id. 
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F. Wisconsin 
 
The rules in Wisconsin with respect to this issue are 
provided by statute.  The basic rule is similar to that in 
Washington: creditors are allowed to attach all property that 
was formerly part of the community property estate, but only to 
the extent of the value of such property at the time of the 
divorce.137  However, creditors in Wisconsin are provided 
additional rights post-divorce that are substantially greater 
than Washington creditors could ever receive.  First, the divorce 
decree may provide that income of a spouse be available after 
the divorce to satisfy a community debt for which only the other 
spouse is personally liable; absent such a provision, no such 
income of the non-liable spouse is available for satisfaction of 
such a debt.138  Second, the divorce decree may provide for the 
imposition of personal liability on a spouse after the divorce for 
a community debt for which only the other spouse is personally 
liable.139 
Thus, creditors in Wisconsin are afforded the same rights as 
creditors in Washington under the basic rule.  If a Wisconsin 
creditor is provided the right to reach post-divorce income of a 
non-liable spouse to satisfy a community debt, that creditor is 
treated similar to creditors in Texas and Louisiana with respect 
to that particular debt.  As discussed earlier, community debts 
in Wisconsin can be satisfied during marriage from community 
property, so allowing a creditor to satisfy its obligation from 
post-divorce income of the non-liable spouse constitutes a 
limited extension of that creditor’s rights during the marriage to 
the period after divorce.  If, however, the divorce decree also 
provides for the imposition of personal liability for a community 
debt on a non-liable spouse, that creditor’s rights will be 
significantly enhanced simply because of the divorce, and the 
creditor will consequently receive a windfall.  The creditor will 
now be entitled to file an action against the previously non-liable 
spouse and obtain a judgment that is enforceable, not only 
against community property received in the divorce, but also 
 
137.  See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2m) (West 2009). 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. 
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against that spouse’s separate property owned during the 
marriage and any property that spouse acquires after the 
divorce. 
 
G. Arizona 
 
Arizona has a statutory scheme providing for the treatment 
of debts in a divorce proceeding,140 but that scheme does not 
specifically resolve this issue.141  The rules in Arizona with 
respect to this issue have been provided by the intermediate 
courts of appeal; the Supreme Court of Arizona has not ruled 
directly on the issue.  In Community Guardian Bank v. 
Hamlin,142 Jerry Hamlin (“Husband”) was solely liable for an 
obligation to Community Guardian Bank (“Bank”).143  Bank 
brought an action against both Husband and Janice Hamlin 
(“Wife”) alleging several counts, including unjust enrichment.144  
A default judgment was obtained against Wife on the unjust 
enrichment count.145  Bank served a writ of garnishment against 
Wife’s employer, and Husband and Wife subsequently 
divorced.146  Wife then moved to quash the writ of 
garnishment.147  Wife argued that Bank was not entitled to 
 
140.  See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West 2007). 
141.  See Ratner, supra note 8, at 215 (referring to the statutory scheme 
as a “creditors bill of rights” with regard to divorce proceedings); see also ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-318(E)(2), (H), (J), (L), (West 2007) (providing that a 
court may require parties to submit a proposed debt distribution plan which, 
inter alia, states how community creditors will be paid.  Additionally, courts 
are required to reflect, in its orders, the debt distribution plan that it approves.  
The statute also authorizes a court to impose liens on the separate property of 
a spouse or on the community property a spouse receives in the divorce to 
secure the payment of community debts that the court orders that spouse to 
pay.  It does not specify whether that lien would be imposed in favor of the 
creditor or the other spouse.  The statute makes clear, however, that the 
assignment of community debts to one spouse or the other for payment is 
binding on the spouses only and not on any creditors.  Thus, any such lien 
would apparently be in favor of the other spouse only).  This statutory scheme 
does not specifically resolve the issue regarding the rights of creditors after 
divorce with respect to a debt for which only one spouse is liable. 
142.  See generally 898 P.2d 1005 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
143.  Id. at 1007. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. 
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garnish her post-divorce wages because she was not personally 
liable to Bank for the obligation.148  The Court first determined 
that the default judgment against Wife was a community 
obligation because Bank alleged in its complaint that the 
obligation was created on behalf of and for the benefit of the 
community estate.149  The Court then discussed Arizona law 
regarding the obligations of spouses after divorce for community 
debts.150  The Court stated that “[a] divorce court has the 
statutory power to divide the community assets and 
obligations. . . . However, the court’s allocation of community 
obligations does not affect the rights of third party creditors.”151  
The Court was not at all concerned with how the obligation to 
Bank was allocated in the divorce; its only concern was that the 
judgment created a community debt.152  The Court then stated 
that the issue of whether a spouse is liable after divorce for 
community debts is “quite clear in Arizona: both former spouses 
remain jointly liable for community obligations after divorce.”153  
The Court then held that Wife was personally liable after the 
divorce for the obligation to Bank, and Bank was thus entitled 
to garnish her post-divorce wages to satisfy the judgment.154 
Creditors in Arizona are thus afforded greater rights than 
creditors in any other state with regard to liability of spouses 
after divorce for debts incurred during the marriage.  Spouses 
are personally liable after divorce for all community debts.  
Creditor’s rights in Arizona are significantly enhanced simply 
because of the divorce, and the creditor will consequently receive 
a windfall.  The creditor will now be entitled to file an action 
against the previously non-liable spouse and obtain a judgment 
enforceable not only against community property that spouse 
 
148.  Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1995). 
149.  Id. at 1009. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. (citations omitted). 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1995); see also In Re Oliphant, 221 B.R. 506, 509 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing Cmty. 
Guardian Bank, 898 P.2d at 1009) (interpreting Arizona law and holding that, 
after divorce, “each former spouse remains individually liable to creditors of 
the former community”). 
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receives in the divorce, but also against that spouse’s separate 
property owned during the marriage and any property that 
spouse acquires after the divorce.155 
 
H. New Mexico and Nevada 
 
Case law in New Mexico and Nevada is consistent with the 
generally prevailing rule in all of the common law and 
community property states, as follows:  a divorce decree ordering 
one spouse to pay a debt is binding only on the spouses and not 
on a creditor who was not a party to the decree; the divorce 
decree cannot reduce any rights the creditor had prior to the 
divorce.156  Thus, if both spouses are liable for an obligation, the 
creditor can, either prior to or after the divorce, bring an action 
and obtain a personal judgment against either or both of them.157  
No statutory or case law exists, however, in either state dealing 
with the issue regarding liability of spouses after divorce for 
debts incurred during the marriage by only one spouse.158 
 
IV. Debtor-Creditor Law and Other Policy Considerations 
 
A. General 
 
The law of debtors and creditors in the United States has 
developed over the years into an intricate system that attempts 
to balance the rights and interests of each of the parties.  Some 
aspects of this legal system favor debtors and other aspects favor 
 
155.  See Ratner, supra note 8, at 218–23 (discussing and criticizing the 
“windfall” that creditors receive under Arizona law when their married debtor 
divorces his spouse.). 
156.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
157.  See Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v. Roderiguez, 770 P.2d 533, 538 
(N.M. 1989) (holding that the spouses’ marriage settlement agreement 
pursuant to their divorce had no effect on the rights of a pre-divorce creditor 
who was not a party to the agreement); Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 756 
P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev. 1988) (holding that a divorce decree to which a creditor 
was not a party did not divest the creditor of the right to collect its debt from a 
spouse who was liable). 
158.  See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 811 n.179 (citing to sources and 
concluding that no statutory or case law exists in New Mexico or Nevada 
dealing with that issue). 
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creditors.  Creditors have a general expectation that the law will 
entitle them to be paid according to the terms of their bargain or 
the rule of law which gave rise to the debt they are owed.  
Creditors generally have the right in all jurisdictions to bring a 
legal cause of action and obtain a judgment against a debtor who 
is personally liable for an obligation to a creditor and has 
defaulted on payment of such obligation.  If the debtor 
subsequently declines to pay the judgment, the creditor has a 
range of post-judgment remedies available against the debtor, 
such as execution on the debtor’s assets as necessary to satisfy 
the judgment. 
Debtors are not left without protection in the collection 
process.  Various federal and state laws have been enacted to 
protect debtors from overreaching and engaging in abusive 
tactics in attempts to collect debts.  Examples of federal law 
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act159 and the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act.160  Many states have enacted their own 
versions of those laws, as well as deceptive trade practices and 
other consumer protection legislation.161 
All jurisdictions have enacted exemption laws to protect 
certain property of a debtor from the execution process with 
respect to a judgment.  The basic purpose of exemption laws is 
that creditors cannot “leave the debtor with so little property 
that the debtor and the debtor’s family will become a charge on 
the community.”162  However, the exemption laws enacted by the 
various states display a wide range of protection granted to 
debtors, with some states affording debtors very minimal 
protection, while others are quite generous with regard to the 
amount of property that debtors can exempt.  Texas is a prime 
example of a state that affords substantial protection to debtors 
through its homestead exemption with no dollar limit and its 
generous protection of a wide range of personal property.163 
Undoubtedly, the greatest protection afforded to debtors in 
 
159.  15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2009). 
160.  Id. at § 1692 et seq. (2009). 
161.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01-17.926 (West 2011). 
162.  ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 79 (7th ed. Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Bus. 2014). 
163.  See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 et seq. (West 2006). 
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the collection process is the federal bankruptcy law.164  
Individual debtors filing for bankruptcy protection generally 
have a choice between a liquidation or reorganization 
proceeding.165  Liquidation involves disposition of all the debtor’s 
nonexempt assets by a trustee appointed to represent the 
bankruptcy estate and distribution of the proceeds to 
creditors.166  In a reorganization bankruptcy, the debtor retains 
all assets and proposes a plan to the court regarding payment of 
some portion of his debts over a period of time.167  In both types  
of proceedings, however, any debts remaining unpaid at the 
end of the case are discharged,168 and a permanent injunction 
is imposed preventing collection of those debts in the future.169 
 
B. Fraudulent Transfer Law 
 
1. History 
 
For as long as there have existed debtors and creditors, 
debtors have attempted at times to avoid paying their debts.  A 
common avoidance technique has been to transfer nonexempt 
assets to friends and family members to prevent creditors from 
executing on those assets to satisfy a judgment.  The law has 
long attempted to prevent debtors from engaging in such 
transfers for the purpose of defrauding their creditors.  
Fraudulent transfer doctrines developed under Roman law, 
which were used as a basis for English common law as early as 
1571 in Elizabethan England.170  The English common law then 
served as the basis for American fraudulent transfer doctrine.171 
 
164.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2016). 
165.  See generally id. §§ 701–84 (governing liquidation bankruptcy); id. 
§§ 1301–30 (governing reorganization bankruptcies for individual debtors.). 
166.  See generally id. §§ 701–84. 
167.  See generally id. §§ 1301–30. 
168.  See generally id. § 727, 1328. 
169.  See generally id. § 524. 
170.  See Kenneth C. Kettering, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act; 
or, the 2014 Amendments to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 70 BUS. 
LAW. 777, 778 (2015) (explaining that fraudulent transfer “was elaborately 
developed in Roman law, and English common law borrowed from that 
source”). 
171.  See id. (stating that “the English Statute of 13 Elizabeth,” enacted 
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All jurisdictions in the United States have enacted 
fraudulent transfer laws.  The first important codification of 
fraudulent transfer law in America was the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act (“UFCA”), which was promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(“NCCUSL”) in 1918, and which remains current law in 
Maryland and New York.172  In 1984, NCCUSL modernized and 
updated the uniform law by promulgating the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”).173  As of 2014, the UFTA had 
been enacted in forty-five jurisdictions and is currently the 
prevailing fraudulent transfer law in the United States.174  Five 
other jurisdictions have enacted fraudulent transfer laws other 
than the UFCA and the UFTA.175  In 2014, NCCUSL 
promulgated amendments to the UFTA, renaming the UFTA as 
the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”).176  These 
amendments were relatively minor in nature.177  Because the 
UFTA currently remains as the prevailing fraudulent transfer 
in the United States, it will be used for purposes of discussion 
and analysis of the issues discussed in this Article. 
 
2. General Description of UFTA 
 
The basic purpose of the UFTA is to provide a cause of action 
and specific remedies to creditors when debtors make certain 
transfers of property that are defined under the UFTA as 
fraudulent.178  Those remedies include avoidance of the transfer 
to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;179 
 
in 1571, “is traditionally referred to as the fountainhead of American law on 
the subject” (citation omitted)). 
172.  See id. at 779. 
173.  See id. 
174.  See id. at n.11 (noting that these forty-five jurisdictions include 
forty-three states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). 
175.  See id. (listing these states as Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, South 
Carolina, and Virginia). 
176.  See Kettering, supra, note 170, at 779. 
177.  See id. at 779–80 (stating that “the substantive changes made by the 
amendments, though significant enough to warrant attention, are . . . light”). 
178.  See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 7, 8 (1984). 
179.  See id. § 7(a)(1). 
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attachment against the property transferred;180 execution by 
levy on the property transferred if the creditor has obtained a 
judgment against the debtor and the court so orders; and 
recovery of a judgment against certain transferees for the value 
of the property transferred.181 
A transfer is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of 
or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes 
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other 
encumbrance.”182  An asset is defined as property of a debtor, but 
does not include: 
 
(i) [P]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a 
valid lien; (ii) property to the extent it is generally 
exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or (iii) an 
interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process 
by a creditor holding a claim against only one 
tenant.183 
 
Property is defined as “anything that may be the subject of 
ownership.”184 A transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor if it is 
described in either Section 4 or Section 5 of the UFTA.185  Section 
4 applies “whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the 
transfer was made,” and makes the transfer fraudulent if the 
debtor made the transfer: 
 
(1) [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
any creditor of the debtor; or (2) [w]ithout 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the 
debtor: (i) [w]as engaged or was about to engage 
in a business or a transaction for which the 
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably 
 
180.  Id. § 7(a)(2). 
181.  See id. § 8(b). 
182.  Id. § 1(12). 
183.  Id. § 1(2). 
184.  Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 1(10) (1984). 
185.  See id. §§ 4, 5. 
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small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) [i]ntended to incur, or believed or reasonably 
should have believed, that he [or she] would incur, 
debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they 
became due.186 
 
Section 4(b) provides a list of factors that may be considered 
in determining actual intent under Section 4(a)(1). 
Section 5 applies only to creditors “whose claim arose before 
the transfer was made.”187  Section 5(a) makes the transfer 
fraudulent “if the debtor made the transfer . . . without receiving 
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the 
debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or 
obligation.”188  A debtor is insolvent by definition “if the sum of 
the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a 
fair valuation.”189  For purposes of determining whether a debtor 
is insolvent, assets that have been “transferred, concealed, or 
removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that 
[have] been transferred in a manner making the transfer 
voidable under this [Act]” are not included in the calculation.190  
Also not included in the calculation are debts “to the extent [they 
are] secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor.”191  A 
debtor “who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they 
become due is presumed to be insolvent.”192 
The term reasonably equivalent value is not defined in the 
UFTA.  Section 3(b), however, provides a safe harbor for certain 
transfers, stating that: 
 
[A] person gives a reasonably equivalent value if 
the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an 
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, 
 
186.  Id. § 4(a). 
187.  Id. § 5(a). 
188.  Id. § 5(a), (b) (making fraudulent certain preferential transfers to 
creditors).  
189.  Id. § 2(a). 
190.  Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 2(d) (1984). 
191.  Id. § 2(e). 
192.  Id. § 2(b). 
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noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a 
power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of 
the interest of the debtor upon default under a 
mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.193 
 
The UFTA applies to a division of property in a divorce only 
if such a division constitutes a transfer of an asset, as those terms 
are defined in the UFTA.  Transfers of assets routinely occur in 
a divorce in common law property jurisdictions, because all 
property owned at divorce is the property of one of the spouses, 
or both spouses if it is jointly owned.  Division of the marital 
property necessarily requires the parties or the court to transfer 
property interests from one spouse to the other.  In community 
property jurisdictions, it is the community property estate that 
is divided upon divorce.  In all community property jurisdictions, 
the spouses are treated as co-owners of the community property 
owned during marriage; the spouses’ interests in community 
property are, at least in some respects, similar to a tenancy in 
common.194  Division of community property at divorce 
effectuates a partition of the spouses’ co-ownership interests in 
the property.195  As a consequence, division of community 
property at divorce, as in common law property jurisdictions, 
necessarily requires the parties or the court to transfer property 
interests from one spouse to the other. 
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
divorcing spouses who voluntarily divide their marital property 
pursuant to a property settlement agreement could do so with 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, and thus 
run afoul of Section 4(a)(1) of the UFTA.196  In any situation 
 
193.  Id. § 3(b). 
194.  See generally REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 18 
(stating that the “equality of the interests of spouses is a fundamental principle 
of community property law which all community property jurisdictions now 
recognize”).  The analogy of community property ownership to a tenancy in 
common is not entirely accurate, but the conceptual relationship is clearly 
present.  Id. at 22 (stating “[s]ome of the rules applicable to co-ownership 
between unmarried persons do not apply to community co-ownership”). 
195.  See generally id. at 350–53 (discussing the methodologies adopted 
by the various community property jurisdictions for dividing the community 
property estate, and the effect of such a division as a partition of the 
community property). 
196.  See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(1) (1984). 
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where one spouse is solely liable for a large debt, the spouses 
could obtain a collusive divorce for the purpose of awarding the 
nonexempt assets to the non-debtor spouse, thereby preventing  
the creditor  from attaching those assets to satisfy a judgment 
against the debtor spouse.  It is extremely difficult to imagine 
how that could occur in cases where the trial court divides the 
marital property at the conclusion of a contested trial.  The 
constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA in Sections 4(a)(2)197 
and 5,198 however, could result in a division of property being 
treated as a fraudulent transfer in either situation.  A 
determining factor pursuant to those sections would be whether 
the debtor spouse received a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the property awarded to the non-debtor spouse.  
Again, it is easy to imagine how that could occur when the 
divorcing spouses voluntarily divide their marital property 
pursuant to a property settlement agreement; however, it could 
also easily occur in situations where the trial court divides the 
marital property in jurisdictions that do not require an equal 
division of marital property in a divorce.199 
In Texas, for example, the trial court is required to divide 
the community property estate in a manner that the court deems 
just and right.200  The trial court is given extremely wide 
discretion in making that division, and has made it clear that 
the division is not required to be equal.201  There are a large 
range of factors that the court is allowed to consider in exercising 
its discretion, including fault in the breakup of the marriage, 
disparity in earning capacity, and many others.202  In cases 
where one spouse has engaged in particularly egregious 
behavior during the marriage that led to the divorce, courts have 
awarded very large portions of the community property to the 
 
197.  See id. § 4(a)(2). 
198.  See id. § 5. 
199.  See generally REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 350–
51 (describing rules in the community property jurisdictions for dividing 
community property at divorce and noting that some community property 
jurisdictions require an equal division of community property at divorce while 
others do not). 
200.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West 2006). 
201.  See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981). 
202.  Id. 
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aggrieved spouse.203  Division of the community property estate 
in these cases has often resulted in the spouse awarded little or 
no community property in the divorce receiving less than 
reasonably equivalent value for the community property 
transferred to the aggrieved spouse.  Assuming that spouse has 
debts that existed at the time of the divorce for which only that 
spouse is personally liable, those creditors have a potential claim 
under Sections 4(a)(2)204 or 5205 of the UFTA. 
At first glance, it would seem that applying the constructive 
fraud provisions of the UFTA in cases where the trial court 
orders an unequal division of marital property in a divorce is 
inconsistent with the  statutory authority to make that unequal 
division of marital property.  For example, in Texas, the trial 
court  has wide discretion to make an unequal division of 
community property in a divorce; but application of the 
constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA would then allow a 
creditor to bring an action against a non-liable spouse 
subsequent to the divorce and recover property, or its value, if 
the liable spouse received less than reasonably equivalent value 
in the divorce for the community property transferred to the non-
liable spouse.  However, application of the constructive fraud 
provisions of the UFTA in that situation would be no more 
inconsistent with the statutory authority in Texas to make an 
unequal division of marital property in a divorce than are the 
current rules which allow a creditor to attach nonexempt 
property of a non-liable spouse after divorce to the same extent 
the creditor could have done so during the marriage, as 
discussed in Part III(D) of this Article. 
 
3. Jurisdictions Applying the UFTA to Division of 
Marital Property in Divorce Proceedings 
 
There are not a great number of courts that have directly 
addressed the issue of whether the UFTA applies to a division of 
 
203.  See Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. App. 1986) 
(trial court awarded 83.5% of the community property estate to wife due to 
husband’s “alcoholism, adultery, and diversion of community assets for the 
benefit of other women”).  
204.  See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (1984). 
205.  See id. § 5. 
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marital property in a divorce proceeding; but those that have 
done so have held uniformly that the UFTA does, in fact, apply. 
Michigan is a good example of a common law jurisdiction 
where this issue has been thoroughly addressed and resolved.206  
In Estes v. Titus,207 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the 
UFTA applies to a division of marital property in a divorce 
judgment that incorporates a property settlement agreement.208  
In that case, Jeff Titus (“Husband”) was convicted of murder and 
sued for wrongful death by the decedent’s wife, Estes 
(“Decedent’s Wife”).209  While that suit was pending, Husband 
was sued for divorce by his wife, Julie Swabash (“Wife”).210  In 
the divorce action, Husband and Wife agreed to unequally divide 
the marital property pursuant to a property settlement 
agreement, with the Wife receiving nearly all the marital 
property, on the ground that Husband was serving a life 
sentence in prison as a result of his murder conviction.211  The 
day following the entry of the divorce judgment, Decedent’s Wife 
sought to intervene in the divorce action and challenged the 
distribution of assets to Husband, contending that the property 
settlement agreement constituted a fraudulent transfer under 
the UFTA.212 
 
206.  See Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown, 849 N.W.2d 
55, 61 (Minn. 2014) (holding that a transfer made pursuant to an uncontested 
marital dissolution decree may be set aside as fraudulent under the UFTA, but 
reserving opinion as to whether the UFTA applies to contested marital 
dissolution decrees); Dowell v. Dennis, 998 P.2d 206, 209, 212–13 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 1999) (holding that a creditor may collaterally attack a divorce decree as 
a fraudulent transfer under the UFTA); Greeninger v. Cromwell, 915 P.2d 479, 
482 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a division of property pursuant to a 
divorce decree may constitute a fraudulent transfer under the UFTA); see also 
Canty v. Otto, 41 A.3d 280, 289–92 (Conn. 2012) (concluding, after an extensive 
analysis, that the UFTA applies to property distributions pursuant to a divorce 
judgment, regardless of whether the distribution is made by the parties 
pursuant to a property settlement agreement or by the court at the conclusion 
of a trial and referencing bankruptcy court decisions which held that the 
distribution of marital assets in a dissolution decree is a transfer for purposes 
of the federal Bankruptcy Code and noted that the definition of transfer in the 
Bankruptcy Code is similar to that in the UFTA). 
207.  See generally 751 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 2008). 
208.  Id. at 503. 
209.  Id. at 495. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. at 495–96. 
212.  Id. at 496. 
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The Court noted that the UFTA applies to any transfer of an 
asset, as those terms are defined in the UFTA, quoting the 
UFTA’s definition of transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of  disposing 
of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and 
includes payment of money, release, and creation of a lien or 
other encumbrance.”213  The Court then explained that a 
distribution of property made by a court in a divorce judgment 
“has the same effect as a deed or a bill of sale . . . effectuat[ing] 
a transfer for purposes of the UFTA when the divorce judgment 
enters.”214 Thus, “property transferred pursuant to a property 
settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce judgment is 
subject to a UFTA action if it meets the definition of an asset.”215 
At this point, California is the only community property 
jurisdiction that has directly addressed the issue of whether the 
UFTA applies to a division of marital property in a divorce 
proceeding.  In Mejia v. Reed, the Supreme Court of California 
held that the UFTA applies to a division of marital property in 
a divorce judgment that incorporates a property settlement 
agreement.216  In that case, Danilo Reed (“Husband”) had an 
extramarital affair that resulted in the birth of a child.217  
Husband’s wife, Violeta Reed (“Wife”), and Husband 
subsequently divorced, pursuant to which Husband and Wife 
agreed to a property settlement agreement providing for the 
transfer of Husband’s interest to Wife in certain jointly held real 
property.218  Prior to the divorce, Husband’s former mistress, 
Rhina Mejia (“Mistress”), filed a paternity action against 
Husband and requested child support.219  After the divorce 
decree was finalized, Mistress filed an action claiming that the 
property settlement agreement was a fraudulent transfer by 
Husband to Wife to prevent Mistress from collecting child 
support, and alleged that Husband executed the property 
settlement agreement with the actual intent to defraud 
 
213.  Estes, 751 N.W.2d at 497. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  See generally 74 P.3d 166 (Cal. 2003). 
217.  Id. at 168. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. at 169. 
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Mistress.220  One of the primary issues on appeal was whether a 
transfer of property pursuant to a property settlement 
agreement in a divorce action could be held invalid under the 
UFTA.221 
The Court began its analysis by discussing the statutory 
tension between the UFTA and California’s family code 
provisions that protect property transferred to a spouse in a 
divorce proceeding from debts for which only the other spouse is 
liable.222  The Supreme Court of California stated that its task 
was to harmonize those two statutory schemes.223  The Court’s 
analysis regarding application of the UFTA to a transfer of 
property pursuant to a property settlement agreement in a 
divorce action was consistent with the Supreme Court of 
Michigan’s analysis of that issue in Estes.224  The UFTA applies 
to any transfer of an asset, as those terms are defined in the 
UFTA, and a distribution of property made by a court in a 
divorce judgment pursuant to a property settlement agreement 
is a transfer of an asset under those definitions.225  Thus, the 
Court held that the UFTA applies to a division of marital 
property in a divorce judgment that incorporates a property 
settlement agreement.226 
The Court then turned to the family code provisions dealing 
with the protection of property transferred to a spouse in a 
divorce from debts for which only the other spouse is liable.  The 
Court referred to Section 916 of the Family Code, which provides 
that property received by a spouse in a divorce is exempt from 
debts incurred by the other spouse before or during marriage, 
and such spouse is not personally liable for those debts unless  
they are assigned for payment to such spouse in the divorce.227  
The Court then described the legislative history of the 
predecessor statute to Section 916, stating that the legislature 
enacted this statute after determining that it is usually unwise 
 
220.  Id. 
221.  Id. at 168. 
222.  Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 169–70 (Cal. 2003); see also supra Part 
III(B) (explaining these family code provisions). 
223.  Mejia, 74 P.3d at 170. 
224.  Compare id., with Estes v. Titus, 751 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 2008). 
225.  Mejia, 74 P.3d at 170. 
226.  Id. at 174. 
227.  Id. at 171.   
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to continue, after divorce, the liability of spouses for community 
debts incurred solely by former spouses.228  The Court also noted 
that, in enacting that statute, the legislature contemplated that 
a divorce court should take the rights of creditors into account 
in allocating debts to the parties by assuring “there will be 
available sufficient property to satisfy the debt by the person to 
whom the debt is assigned, provided the net division is equal.”229  
The Court cited to Section 2550 of the Family Code, providing 
that the trial court must divide the community property estate 
of the parties equally, unless the parties agree otherwise in 
writing or by oral stipulation in open court, but there is no 
requirement that parties divide the community property equally 
in a property settlement agreement or that the court scrutinize 
the agreement to ensure an equal division.230  Moreover, Section 
916 is silent with regard to fraudulent transfers.231 
Thus, the two statutory schemes are facially inconsistent.  
The Family Code protects property transferred to a spouse in a 
divorce proceeding from debts for which only the other spouse is 
liable, so long as the debt is not assigned for payment to such 
spouse in the divorce. However, the UFTA allows a creditor to 
bring an action against a non-liable spouse subsequent to the 
divorce and recover property, or its value, if the division of 
marital property pursuant to the divorce is fraudulent under the 
UFTA.  The Court approached its task of harmonizing the two 
statutory schemes by way of a policy analysis.  It explained that 
a division of community property by the court in the absence of 
agreement of the parties must be done equally, and that 
requirement provides some protection for a creditor of only one 
spouse.232  For that reason, and because of the legislature’s 
interest in protecting the rights of creditors, the Court opined 
that “it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to grant 
married couples a one-time-only opportunity to defraud 
creditors by including the fraudulent transfer in” a property 
settlement agreement.233  As a result, Section 916 must be 
 
228.  Id. 
229.  Id. 
230.  Id. at 171–72. 
231.  Mejia, 74 P.3d at 172. 
232.  Id. at 173. 
233.  Id. 
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interpreted to mean that property received by a spouse in a 
divorce is exempt from debts incurred by the other spouse before 
or during marriage, and such spouse is not personally liable for 
those debts, unless  they are assigned for payment to such 
spouse in the divorce, and except in cases where the division of 
marital property pursuant to the divorce is fraudulent under the 
UFTA.  Stated more simply, the UFTA applies to a division of 
marital property in a divorce judgment that incorporates a 
property settlement agreement.234 
The Court, noting that the Appellate Court found triable 
issues of fact with regard to both actual and constructive fraud, 
then turned to the question of whether there existed a triable 
issue of fact under the UFTA as to constructive fraud.235  The 
Court determined that whether Husband received reasonably 
equivalent value in the division of property pursuant to the 
property settlement agreement was a material disputed fact.236  
However, the Court noted that constructive fraud under Section 
5 of the UFTA requires proof that “the transferor was insolvent 
at the time of the transfer, or rendered insolvent by the 
transfer,” and determined that there was “no triable issue of fact 
on the question of insolvency.”237 
Idaho, a community property jurisdiction, has not directly 
addressed the issue of whether the UFTA applies to a division of 
marital property in a divorce proceeding, but has taken an 
approach that is at least conceptually similar to application of 
portions of the UFTA.  As discussed in Part III(A) of this Article, 
in Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley,238 the Supreme Court 
of Idaho applied debtor-creditor principles to the issue of 
whether a creditor is allowed to obtain a post-divorce judgment 
against a spouse who is not personally liable for a debt incurred 
solely by the other spouse, either before or during the marriage, 
and attach nonexempt property received by the non-liable 
spouse in the divorce.  The Court held that “a creditor may not, 
with one exception, proceed against community assets 
distributed to [a spouse] pursuant to a divorce decree” if that 
 
234.  Id. at 174. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Mejia, 74 P.3d at 174. 
238.  See generally 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986). 
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spouse is not personally liable for the obligation to that 
creditor.239  The Court cited to an earlier case, Spokane 
Merchants’ Ass’n v. Olmstead,240 for the exception: in a divorce, 
when only one spouse is personally liable for an obligation 
incurred during the marriage, “but is not awarded sufficient 
community assets to satisfy such a debt, a creditor may properly 
seek satisfaction for the debt from community property 
distributed to the other spouse.”241  The Court explained that the 
purpose for the exception is to prevent spouses from utilizing 
“divorce proceedings to perpetrate a fraud on creditors of the 
community.”242  These rules bear at least some resemblance to 
the constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA in Sections 
4(a)(2)243 and 5.244 
 
C. Policy Considerations 
 
The basic issue addressed by this Article is to what extent a 
creditor is allowed to obtain a judgment after divorce against a 
spouse who is not personally liable for a debt, which has been 
incurred solely by the other spouse, either before or during the 
marriage.  Accordingly, the question is to what extent is a 
creditor allowed to attach nonexempt property either received by 
the non-liable spouse in the divorce or subsequently acquired by 
such spouse.  As discussed earlier in this Article, the rules 
adopted in most of the community property jurisdictions with 
respect to this issue appear to be primarily focused on the 
perspective of marital property and family law without regard to 
general debtor-creditor law principles and policies.  For example, 
basic fraudulent transfer law has been ignored in those 
jurisdictions and not applied in the usual manner.  As a result, 
the rules developed in those jurisdictions with regard to the post-
divorce liability issue are not consistent with the basic principles 
and policies of debtor-creditor law.  This Section will explore 
 
239.  Id. at 897. 
240.  See generally 327 P.2d 385 (Idaho 1958). 
241.  Twin Falls Bank, 723 P.2d at 897 (citing Spokane Merchants Ass’n, 
327 P.2d 385). 
242.  Id. (citing Spokane Merchants Ass’n, 327 P.2d 385). 
243.  See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (1984). 
244.  See id. § 5. 
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whether valid policy reasons exist for treating creditors 
differently in this context than creditors in other situations. 
The basic right of any creditor is to be paid the full amount 
they are owed according to the terms and conditions established 
at the time the obligation is created, either by agreement of the 
parties or applicable rules of law.  If the obligation is created by 
contractual agreement, the creditor has the ability to evaluate 
the level of risk that it desires to assume, or even whether to 
extend credit at all.  The creditor has the ability to acquire a 
substantial amount of information with regard to its debtor.  The 
creditor can obtain the debtor’s permission to conduct a credit 
investigation by the use of credit reporting agencies and 
determine the debtor’s credit score.  The creditor certainly can 
determine whether its debtor is married or single.  If the debtor 
is married, the creditor can demand that the debtor’s spouse 
agree to become jointly liable for the obligation.  However, if the 
debtor owns unencumbered assets, then the creditor can further 
protect itself by acquiring security interests in those assets to 
secure the obligation.245 
Unsecured creditors are generally disfavored under the law 
and have few rights compared to secured creditors.246  As 
discussed earlier in this Article, creditors generally have the 
right in all jurisdictions to bring a legal cause of action and 
obtain a judgment against a debtor who is personally liable for 
an obligation and who has defaulted on payment of such 
obligation.  If the debtor subsequently declines to pay the 
judgment, the creditor has a range of post-judgment remedies 
available against the debtor, such as execution on the debtor’s 
assets as necessary to satisfy the judgment.  If a creditor who 
has not yet obtained a judgment is concerned or actually 
suspects that the debtor will transfer nonexempt assets to avoid 
satisfaction of any judgment ultimately acquired by the creditor, 
pre-judgment attachment remedies are available, subject to 
 
245.  See generally Paulsen, supra note 9, at 835–37 (discussing rights of 
creditors and their ability to protect themselves when extending credit). 
246.  See generally WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 164, at 40–44, 131–
36 (explaining that the rights of secured creditors are vastly superior to the 
rights of unsecured creditors, and the superior rights of the secured creditor 
compared to the minimal rights of the unsecured creditor is a paradigm that 
extends into federal bankruptcy law). 
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certain procedural and constitutional safeguards.247  All 
creditors assume a risk that, subject to application of a 
jurisdiction’s fraudulent transfer law, a debtor will dispose of or 
otherwise dissipate his nonexempt assets that would be 
normally available to a creditor in the post-judgment execution 
process.248  This could occur whether the debtor is single or 
married.  However, if a debtor is married and his spouse is not 
personally liable for the obligation, the debtor has the added 
ability to transfer nonexempt assets to his spouse, thus making 
them unavailable to his creditors in a collection action. 
A transfer of assets to a spouse could be accomplished in a 
number of different ways, but the usual manner is by making a 
gift of the assets.  In community property jurisdictions, property 
received by gift is characterized as separate property of the 
donee spouse,249 even when the gift is made by the other spouse.  
Thus, the property is placed outside of the creditor’s reach in a 
collection action.  The UFTA applies to such a transfer in the 
same way it applies to transfers of assets outside the marriage, 
thereby protecting the creditor from transfers that the UFTA 
describes as fraudulent. 
In community property jurisdictions, spouses have the 
ability to effectively transfer community property assets by 
entering into an agreement to change the character of property 
from community property to separate property of one of the 
spouses.250  Thus, a debtor spouse could enter into such an 
agreement to make community property the separate property 
of the non-debtor spouse, thereby placing such property outside 
the creditor’s reach in a collection action.  The extent to which 
such an agreement is binding on creditors varies significantly 
among the community property jurisdictions.251  In Texas, for 
 
247.  See generally id. (briefly explaining the legal process required for a 
creditor to obtain pre-judgment remedies with respect to nonexempt property 
of a debtor). 
248.  See id. at 841 (discussing risks that all creditors must assume when 
extending credit). 
249.  See, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.001(2) (West 2006). 
250.  See generally, REPPY, SAMUEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 27, at 35–
43 (discussing the rules applicable in community property jurisdictions for 
spouses to make express agreements concerning the characterization of 
property owned during marriage). 
251.  See generally id. at 338–40 (discussing the rules applicable in 
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example, spouses may enter into pre- and post-marital 
agreements and agree to change the character of property from 
community to separate, unless by doing so they intend to 
defraud pre-existing creditors.252  At least one community 
property jurisdiction (Arizona) has recognized that the UFTA 
applies to agreements to change the character of  property from 
community to separate.253  In State ex rel Industrial Commission 
of Arizona v. Wright,254 the Court held that an agreement 
between spouses to change the character of marital property is 
a transfer as that term is defined in the UFTA.255  The Court 
explained that an agreement to change the character of property 
constitutes the transfer of property rights from one spouse to the 
other.256  Thus, the UFTA clearly applies to all transfers of 
property pursuant to a pre- or post-marital property agreement, 
protecting creditors from transfers that the UFTA describes as 
fraudulent. 
A transfer of assets can also be accomplished in any 
jurisdiction by a division of marital property at divorce.  As 
discussed in Part IV(B) of this Article, the UFTA clearly applies 
to all such transfers, thereby protecting creditors from transfers 
which the UFTA describes as fraudulent.  As such, any transfer 
of assets from one spouse to another, however structured, is 
subject to the UFTA in the same way transfers of assets by a 
single person or by a married person to a non–spouse are.  This 
 
community property jurisdictions with regard to the extent to which marital 
property agreements are binding on creditors).  In Nevada, for example, 
agreements between spouses to change the character of community property 
to separate property do not affect creditors, but are binding on creditors in 
Washington and California.  See id. at 339.  In Wisconsin, such agreements 
cannot adversely affect a creditor absent such creditor’s actual knowledge of 
the agreement at the time the obligation is incurred.  See id. In Louisiana, such 
agreements must be recorded to be effective against subsequent creditors to be 
effective.  See id. 
252.  See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 826 (explaining the constitutional and 
statutory limitations with regard to pre- and post-marital property 
agreements); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 4.106(a) (West 2006). 
253.  See State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Wright, 43 P.3d 203, 206 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that marital transmutations of community 
property to separate property are subject to the UFTA). 
254.  Id. 
255.  Id. at 205–06. 
256.  Id. at 206. 
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results in a logical consistency with respect to the rights of 
creditors.  Creditors should be entitled to the same protection of 
their right to be paid, regardless of whether their debtor is 
married or single at any point in the debtor-creditor 
relationship. 
So, what is the purpose for the rules adopted by some of the 
community property jurisdictions—as described in Part III of 
this Article—which allow creditors to attach property 
transferred to the non-debtor spouse post-divorce?  As discussed, 
some of those jurisdictions, such as Louisiana and Texas, simply 
extend the rules for liability of marital property for debts 
incurred prior to or during marriage to the period after divorce.  
However, other jurisdictions, such as Wisconsin and Arizona, go 
even further by allowing the rights of creditors to be significantly 
enhanced simply because of divorce, providing creditors with 
potential windfalls. 
The rules adopted by community property jurisdictions 
regarding whether community property is exempt from debts 
incurred solely by one spouse—as discussed in Part II of this 
Article—were critically necessary for protection of creditors 
during an intact marriage.  If community property was exempt 
from debts incurred solely by one spouse, a creditor would in 
many cases not be able to collect unless it assured that both 
spouses were personally liable for it.  This would impose a 
burden on creditors to determine that its debtor is, in fact, 
married and require his or her spouse to participate in the debt-
creating transaction.  It would be essentially impossible for a 
creditor to accomplish this in cases involving involuntary debts, 
such as an obligation imposed by tort or tax law, for which 
personal liability only attaches to those on whom the obligation 
is imposed by law. 
However, there is no conceivable purpose in extending these 
rules to the period after divorce and enabling a creditor to attach 
former community property which has been transferred in the 
divorce to the non-debtor spouse.257  In fact, doing so creates a 
 
257.  Case law in the community property jurisdictions that extend those 
rules to the period after divorce is devoid of any rationale for doing so.  See, 
e.g., Paulsen, supra note 9, at 815–16 (asserting that there is no “clearly 
articulated rationale” provided in the Texas decisions that extend the rules 
enacted to protect the rights of creditors during an intact marriage, with regard 
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serious injustice with regard to a former spouse who was never 
personally liable for the obligation and received the former 
community property in exchange for other community property.  
Furthermore, creditors do not need these rules to be extended to 
the period after divorce for their rights to be adequately 
protected.  Creditors of single debtors, who default on their 
obligations and have transferred property to others, are 
protected by the UFTA.  The same is true of creditors of married 
debtors who default on their obligations and transfer property to 
a non-spouse, or to a spouse by gift or by execution of a pre-or 
post-marital agreement.  There is simply no reason to provide 
even greater protection than that provided by the UFTA to 
creditors of married debtors who transfer property in their 
divorce to former spouses. 
Furthermore, it defies logic to extend community property 
rules, which were enacted to protect the rights of creditors 
during an intact marriage, to the period after divorce.  These 
rules are directed at the rights of creditors to seize marital 
community property.  Divorced parties no longer have 
community property because all community property has been 
partitioned by agreement or court order upon their divorce, and 
any community property not partitioned is held by the former 
spouses jointly as tenants in common.258 
 
D. Proposal 
 
The basic issue addressed by this Article is to what extent a 
creditor is allowed to obtain a judgment after divorce against a 
spouse who is not personally liable for a debt, which has been 
incurred solely by the other spouse, either before or during the 
marriage.  Accordingly, it must be determined to what extent 
such a creditor is allowed to attach nonexempt property either 
received by the non-liable spouse in the divorce or subsequently 
acquired by such spouse.  As discussed, community property 
jurisdictions should adopt rules to ensure that:  (1) spouses who 
are not personally liable for debts owed at the time of divorce are 
 
to community property, to the period after divorce). 
258.  See id. at 830–31 (explaining that there is no community property 
that continues to exist after a divorce). 
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not unfairly deprived of community property that is transferred 
to them in the divorce; (2) rights of creditors are protected in a 
way that is consistent with the rights of creditors in any other 
situation; and (3) family law and debtor-creditor law are both 
applied consistently and fairly pursuant to the purposes for 
which such law was originally enacted.  California embodies a 
community property jurisdiction that has adopted rules most 
closely accomplishing these objectives.  As discussed in Part 
III(B) of this Article, a California statute provides that property 
received by a spouse in a divorce is exempt from debts incurred 
by the other spouse before or during marriage, and such spouse 
is not personally liable for those debts, unless such a debt is 
assigned for payment to such spouse in the divorce.  In addition, 
as discussed in Part IV(B)(3) of this Article, case law in 
California makes it abundantly clear that the UFTA applies to 
a division of marital property in a divorce judgment. All 
community property jurisdictions should follow California’s lead 
and adopt rules providing that property received in a divorce is 
exempt from debts incurred solely by the other spouse before or 
during marriage, with the only exception being to the extent that 
fraudulent transfer law applies to the division of the marital 
property in the divorce proceeding. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The primary thrust of this Article is to address an issue that 
creditors face when seeking a judgment from a divorcee not 
personally liable for a debt.  The rules developed by each of the 
community property jurisdictions with respect to this issue are 
quite distinct and were discussed separately for each jurisdiction 
in Part III.  Some jurisdictions have adopted rules that are quite 
restrictive with regard to the rights of creditors; the rules in 
other jurisdictions are quite favorable to creditors, resulting in 
significant enhancement of the rights of creditors in some 
jurisdictions, and potential windfalls to creditors, simply 
because of the divorce. 
The rules adopted in most of the community property 
jurisdictions with respect to this issue appear to be primarily 
focused on the perspective of marital property and family law 
without regard to general debtor-creditor law principles and 
50https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/6
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policies.  For example, fraudulent transfer law has been ignored 
in those jurisdictions and not applied in the usual manner.  As a 
result, the rules developed in those jurisdictions with regard to 
the post-divorce liability issue are not consistent with the basic 
principles and policies of debtor-creditor law.  Part IV of this 
Article discussed basic debtor-creditor law as it relates to this 
issue.  In particular, Part IV(B) described fraudulent transfer 
law under the UFTA and discussed its application to a division 
of marital property in a divorce proceeding, concluding that the 
UFTA does in fact apply. 
Part IV(C) discussed policy considerations regarding the 
rights of creditors, and concluded that there is no conceivable 
purpose in extending the rules that were enacted to protect the 
rights of creditors during an intact marriage, with regard to 
community property, to the period after divorce.  In fact, doing 
so creates a serious injustice with regard to a non-debtor former 
spouse.  Furthermore, creditors do not need those rules to be 
extended to the period after divorce for their rights to be 
adequately protected because they are already protected by the 
UFTA.  There simply is no reason to provide creditors of married 
debtors who obtain a divorce and transfer property in the divorce 
to their former spouses with any greater protection than any 
other creditor is afforded. 
As a result, all community property jurisdictions should 
provide that property received in a divorce is exempt from debts 
incurred solely by the other spouse before or during marriage, 
except to the extent that fraudulent transfer law applies to the 
division of the marital property in the divorce proceeding.  This 
will ensure that spouses who are not personally liable for debts 
owed at the time of divorce are treated fairly after the divorce is 
finalized, rights of creditors are protected in a way that is 
consistent with the rights of creditors in any other situation, and 
family law and debtor-creditor law are both applied consistently 
and fairly. 
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